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We analyze the role of debt in corporate governance with respect to a large emerging economy, India, 
where debt has been an important source of external finance. First, we examine the extent to which debt 
acts as a disciplining device in those corporations where potential for over investment is present. We 
undertake a comparative evaluation of group-affiliated and non-affiliated companies to see if the 
governance role of debt is sensitive to ownership and control structures.  Second, we examine the role of 
institutional change in strengthening the disciplining effect or mitigating the expropriating effect of debt.  
In doing so, we estimate, simultaneously, the relation between Tobin’s Q and leverage using a large cross-
section of listed manufacturing firms in India for three years, 1996, 2000, and 2003. Our analyses indicate 
that while in the early years of institutional change, debt did not have any disciplinary effect on either 
standalone or group affiliated firms, the disciplinary effect appeared in the later years as institutions 
become more market oriented. We also find limited evidence of debt being used as an expropriation 
mechanism in group firms that are more vulnerable to such expropriation. However, the disciplining effect 
of debt is found to persist even after controlling for such expropriation possibilities. In general, our results 
highlight the role of ownership structures and institutions in debt governance.  
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University, London. The usual disclaimer applies.Introduction 
The literature on corporate finance and governance widely recognizes debt as an important 
mechanism for solving agency problems in corporations characterized by separation of ownership 
and control. Specifically, as highlighted by Jensen (1986) and several others
1, debt could be an 
effective disciplining device in the hands of shareholders which can be used strategically to curb 
managerial actions that run counter to the objective of shareholder-value maximization. Managers 
have incentives to expand firm size beyond what is consistent with profit maximization because 
such “empire-building” often leads to increase in managerial power, prestige, perquisites, 
remuneration, and resources under managerial control. The strategic use of debt as a disciplining 
mechanism for reducing agency costs by aligning the interests of the shareholders and managers, 
is dubbed by Jensen (1986) as the “control hypothesis” for debt creation. 
 
The role of debt as a potential disciplining mechanism, however, is considerably weakened in 
corporations where ownership structures are concentrated, and where management is most often 
drawn from among the controlling block of insider shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Prowse, 
1999). In such corporations, that are largely prevalent in Asia and Continental Europe, debt is 
instead posited to be used by controlling insiders as a mechanism for expropriation of minority 
shareholders and other outside stakeholders, like creditors. This can be dubbed as the 
“expropriation hypothesis” for debt creation.  
 
In either case, the effectiveness of debt as a disciplining device or as a mechanism for 
expropriation, is considered to depend on the institutional context within which corporations are 
embedded such as the presence of a well-developed capital market and banking systems,   
effective bankruptcy laws, active takeover markets, and transparent auditing, accounting and 
disclosure norms (Berglof, 1995; Day and Taylor, 2004).  For instance, the presence of an active 
takeover market can reinforce the disciplinary effect of debt (Zwiebel, 1996; Novaes and 
Zingales, 1995), while the absence of transparent accounting and disclosure norms, by adversely 
affecting the flow of accurate information to minority shareholders, may enable insider 
shareholders to use leverage more effectively for expropriation (Baer and Gray, 1996; Faccio et 
al., 2001). 
 
                                                           
1 Related literature emphasizing the role played by debt in reducing agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders are Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1982), 
Stulz (1990), and Hart and Moore (1995). The objective of this paper is to analyze the role of debt in corporate governance with respect to a 
large emerging economy, India, where debt has played an important role as a source of external 
finance both in the pre-liberalized and post-liberalized scenario (see Singh, 1995; Sarkar and 
Sarkar, 2001).  Empirical studies on the role of debt in corporate governance have been till date 
mostly confined to analyzing its disciplining role with respect to widely held corporations in 
developed market settings, particularly the US (see for example, Lummer and McConnell, 1989; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1995) where codified and enforced corporate governance mechanisms 
would already play an important role in reducing agency problems.  There are, however, only a 
handful of studies with regard to the impact of debt financing on agency costs of firms with 
respect to emerging and transition economies which are typically characterized by “extreme” 
agency problems (Driffield et al., 2005; Faccio et al., 2001;Harvey et al., 2004). Such problems 
are considered to stem from complex corporate ownership and control structures with little 
separation of ownership and control, with firms operating in environments with underdeveloped 
corporate governance mechanisms. Yet corporations in these countries are typically more 
leveraged than their counterparts in the US, and it is an open question as to whether debt in these 
corporations can be effectively used as a control mechanism by shareholders or would it be used 
strategically as a mechanism for expropriation by controlling insiders. Limited evidence 
generated from a few cross-country studies seem to suggest that the disciplining effect of debt in 
several of these countries has been rather limited and instead debt has acted more as an 
instrument for expropriation of outside shareholders than as an effective corporate governance 
device (Faccio et al., 2001; Harvey et al., 2004)  
 
The need for systematic and robust evidence on the precise governing role of debt in emerging 
economies like India is underscored by the fact that country level experiences show that the 
quality of debt governance has important system-wide ramifications, and that prior knowledge of 
the underlying dynamics and timely institutional reforms are important to guard against systemic 
crisis. A case in point is the East Asian crisis, with regard to which Prowse (1999) observes that 
notwithstanding the disciplining effect that debt is posited to have on company management, the 
extensive use of debt financing did little to loosen the grip of the insiders as the controlling power 
of debt was weakened by weak monitoring by financial institutions, weak market and statutory 
regulations, legal protection of outside shareholders, high ownership concentration and poorly 
competitive financial systems, all of which together not only imposed high and severe costs on 
the economy, but may have contained the seeds of crises.  A similar argument is made by Faccio 
et al. (2001) who argue that high levels of debt precipitated the East Asian crisis, and one of the 
  2main factors behind this was the  “unmistakably” systematic expropriation by insiders via the use 
of debt, facilitated and camouflaged by ineffective capital market institutions, extensive corporate 
pyramiding via low visibility linkages and extensive access to related party loans. 
 
In analyzing the role of debt in the governance of corporates in India, our paper specifically 
addresses two distinct questions. First, we examine the extent to which debt works as a 
disciplining device in those Indian companies where potential for overinvestment is present, i.e. 
in companies where there are excess cash flows but low growth opportunities.  This is a test of 
Jensen’s (1986) control hypothesis in line with that conducted with respect to US companies by 
McConnell and Servaes (1995). In doing so, however, we extend the test by undertaking a 
comparative evaluation of the role of debt in group-affiliated versus non-affiliated (or stand 
alone) companies in order to gain insights into the important issue of whether the governance role 
of debt is sensitive to ownership and control structures, and whether the disciplinary effect, if any, 
is weaker for group-affiliated firms where the potential for expropriation is theoretically higher.  
 
The second important issue that our analysis seeks to provide insights into is the effect of 
institutional change in facilitating the disciplining role or mitigating the expropriating effect of 
debt. The few studies that explicitly address this question have looked at this issue within a cross-
country context (Faccio et al, 2001; Harvey et al., 2004) rather than analyzing the effect of 
institutional change over time within a particular economy. Since the mid-nineties, capital market 
and corporate governance institutions in India have undergone significant transformation as a 
wide range of reforms have been introduced over time to strengthen minority investor protection, 
activate the takeover market, improve corporate disclosure and accounting rules, and the like. The 
transition process in India can serve as a laboratory setting to examine whether the role of debt as 
a governance mechanism has undergone any change over the years. 
  
In line with our objectives, we estimate the relationship between market value as proxied by 
Tobin’s Q and debt for a large cross-section of listed manufacturing firms in India separately for 
three financial years 1996
2, 2000, and 2003. These years are chosen sufficiently apart to capture 
the effect of institutional changes over time, if any, on the above relationship. The primary 
finding that emerges from our analysis across the years is that while in the early years of 
institutional change, debt does not have any disciplinary effect on either low growth standalone or 
                                                           
2 The financial years 1996, 2000 and 2003 respectively stand for the periods 1995-96, 1999-2000 and 2002-
03. 
  3group affiliated firms, the disciplinary effect appears in the later years as institutions become 
more market oriented. While debt is found to increase firm valuation in 2000 and 2003 for both 
standalones and group affiliates, its effect is less in the latter relative to the former. This discount 
however narrows down significantly between 2000 and 2003, a period when key institutional 
reforms were introduced. We also find limited evidence of debt being used as a mechanism for 
expropriation in group firms that are more vulnerable to such expropriation. However, the 
disciplining effect of debt is found to persist even after controlling for expropriation possibilities.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background literature on 
debt and corporate governance with special focus on emerging economies. Section 3 outlines the 
institutional characteristics associated with debt governance in India, tracing the important 
institutional changes that have taken place over the period of our study. Section 4 discusses the 
hypotheses associated with debt governance in emerging economies as well as describes the data 
used for our analysis. The empirical analysis is reported in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Background Literature 
In this section, we provide a brief review of the theoretical and the empirical literature on the role 
of debt in corporate governance. As highlighted in the introduction, debt can play two contrasting 
roles with regard to the governance of corporations. On the one hand, debt could be a disciplining 
mechanism to contain agency problems between outside shareholders and professional 
management in a widely held corporation (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen, 1986). On the other 
extreme, in corporations with a controlling block of shareholders, and a management that is 
drawn from among the controlling owners, debt can be used by insiders as a device for 
expropriation of outside minority shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Harris and Raviv, 1988; 
Stulz, 1990;). The literature also points to the role that corporate governance and capital market 
institutions play in increasing the effectiveness of debt as a disciplining mechanism, or in 
mitigating the expropriating power of debt. 
 
The disciplining effect of debt, dubbed by Jensen (1986) as the “control hypothesis” of debt 
creation, arises from the fact that debt can constrain managerial expropriation in a situation where 
corporations have more internally generated funds than investment opportunities in terms of the 
availability of projects with positive net present value. If growth opportunities for firms are low, 
the presence of such excess cash flows aggravates the agency problem between managers and 
  4shareholders, as excess cash flows create further opportunities for self-interested managers 
interested in expanding firm size, to take up projects with negative NPV.  This is usually referred 
to as the “overinvestment” problem which reduces the market value of the firm and thereby 
impacts shareholder value adversely. To curb such overinvestment and the resulting shareholder 
expropriation by managers, Jensen (1986) argues that shareholders can increase the component of 
debt in the capital structure. Having debt in the capital structure could reduce managerial 
discretion over free cash flows by pre-committing managers to a fixed stream of debt-repayments. 
Managers would find it in their interest to honour such debt repayments since failure to do so 
could force creditors to take the firm into bankruptcy which would in all probability cause 
managers to lose their job and reputation.   
 
Arguments similar in spirit to Jensen are also made by Grossman and Hart (1982), who contend 
that while both monetary incentives tied to value-maximization and threat of takeovers can 
reduce agency problems, these may not be sufficient to eliminate such problems. In such 
situations, debt that brings with it a risk of bankruptcy, can act as a complementary mechanism. 
The authors show in terms of a theoretical model that even when managers rather than 
shareholders are responsible for choosing a firm’s capital structure, and notwithstanding the fact 
that no manager would ideally like to issue debt due to the threat of bankruptcy, managers would 
in fact find it in their self-interest to choose a capital structure with both debt and equity over all-
equity financing. By committing to a fixed stream of repayments that debt entails, managers 
impose on themselves the commitment to maximize profits, as any other objective other than 
profit maximizing increases the probability bankruptcy. In this scenario, debt is used as a bonding 
mechanism by self-interested management to create an in built disciplining mechanism to protect 
its reputation and tenure. The issue of debt acts as a signal to the market that management is 
committed to profit maximization which leads to higher market valuation of the firm. This in turn 
benefits the management further by decreasing the probability of takeovers and reducing the cost 
of capital.  
 
While debt could reduce agency costs in a corporation by committing managers to pay out excess 
cash flows and curbing overinvestment, there are also costs associated with the use of debt that 
could impact firm value negatively. One of the primary costs of debt in this regard is that high 
level of debt commitments may prevent managers from taking up positive net present value 
projects should such opportunities appear in future. This is referred to by Myers (1977) as the 
underinvestment problem. While, as McConnell and Servaes (1995) observe, the positive and 
  5negative effects of debt with regard to investment opportunities are likely to be present in all 
firms, the positive impact of debt in mitigating agency costs is likely to dominate in firms with 
excess cash flows but low growth opportunities, whereas the negative effect is likely to dominate 
in firms with high growth opportunities.  
 
The disciplining role of debt posited in the control and bonding hypotheses are mostly applicable 
in the context of agency problems that exist in widely held corporations with a separation of 
ownership and control between shareholders and managers (McConnell and Servaes, 1995). 
However, in corporations where the separation between ownership and control is weak and the 
management is often drawn from a controlling block of large insider shareholder, the strategic use 
of debt undergoes a role reversal. In such corporations, the typical agency problem arises not 
between outside shareholders and professional management, but between controlling insiders and 
minority outsiders, wherein insider shareholders strategically issue debt in order to expropriate 
outside minority shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Grullon and Kanatas, 2001; Harvey et al., 
2004). Corporations with concentrated ownership and control structures with insider-dominated 
management are largely prevalent in Asia and Europe, and as La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens 
et al. (2000; 2002), have observed based on their cross-country survey of ownership and control 
structures, such corporations are much more prevalent across countries than is generally believed 
and the “Berle and Means image” of the modern corporation with widely dispersed shareholders 
as typified in many US studies “has begun to show some wear
3”. 
 
The theoretical underpinning of the ‘expropriation hypothesis’ is the following. Corporations with 
concentrated ownership and control typically belong to business groups and it is often the case 
that controlling shareholders (or promoters) of the group exert control over group-affiliated 
companies through a pyramidal structure, with companies arranged down the pyramid in 
descending order of the controlling owner’s cash flow rights. Under such a pyramidal structure of 
control, as several researchers have recently shown, a controlling shareholder has the incentive 
and ability to use unfairly priced transactions to expropriate resources from affiliated companies 
lower down the pyramid to those higher up the pyramid where ownership rights are higher 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2000).  This is the phenomenon of tunneling. A 
mirror image of tunneling is propping (Friedman et al., 2003) whereby  controlling shareholders 
sometimes clandestinely use private resources to temporarily “prop up” group affiliates that are in 
  6trouble.  The incentive to engage in propping today is to preserves the option to expropriate and 
obtain a legitimate share of profits in future.  The propensity to prop is thus correlated with the 
propensity to tunnel and both are associated with firms that have minority shareholders. 
 
The ability to expropriate increases with an increase in insider shareholders’ voting rights, which 
in turn can be increased through increasing the proportion of debt relative to equity in the capital 
structure (Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1990). The incentive to expropriate by increasing the 
proportion of debt in the capital structure could be counter-balanced, as is the case for a 
professional manager, by the increased threat of bankruptcy that comes with higher debt. 
Disciplining factors that are typically ascribed to the managerial concerns, such as reputation 
effects, competitive labor markets, and the market for corporate control, may also apply for 
family owned firms and act as strong   incentives for them to work in the interest of outside 
shareholders and debtors (see for example, Anderson et al., 2002; Casson, 1999; Chami, 1999). In 
fact, such ownership can come with long-term commitments, and given that family owned firms 
also typically re-enter the debt market at specified intervals of time for financing, reputational 
considerations could be strong and therefore one-time bondholder expropriation may not be a 
desirable course of action or bankruptcy, a desirable outcome, for such firms. There are, however, 
others who argue that the potential disciplining effect of bankruptcy threat associated with 
excessive leverage could be significantly attenuated in concentrated ownership structures with 
insider control (Faccio et al., 2001) for at least two reasons. First, in a large number of such 
corporations where the controlling owner doubles up as the manager, job tenure or career is not 
necessarily tied to the debt liabilities of the corporation unlike the case of a professional manager 
who typically cares about the associated loss of job tenure or reputation that follows when debt 
commitments are reneged upon and the firm goes into bankruptcy. Second, reputational 
considerations in insider dominated corporations could be intrinsically weak because in the event 
a company lower down the pyramid goes bankrupt on account of excessive leverage, it may be 
difficult to pin accountability on the controlling owner ensconced in the complex “obscure 
control webs” characterizing pyramidal ownership structures.  
 
Both the control and the expropriation hypotheses of debt creation are considered to be 
conditional on the prevalence of appropriate institutions (Baer and Gray, 1996; Berglof, 1995; 
Day and Taylor, 2004). The existence of well-developed capital markets, financial intermediaries, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 Based on a survey of 27 countries around the world, and using a 20 per cent cut-off definition of control, 
La Porta et al. (1999) show that 30 per cent of large firms in the world are family controlled, and only a 
  7corporate governance and legal institutions in a country can increase the effectiveness of debt as a 
disciplining mechanism, or mitigate the expropriating power of debt.  As a case in point, one of 
the implicit assumptions underlying the disciplining effect of debt is the existence of debt 
covenants and credible threats of bankruptcy which empower creditors with well defined rights to 
repossess some of the firm’s assets or to throw the firm into bankruptcy when debt commitments 
are not met (Hart and Moore, 1989, 1994; La Porta et al. 1999, Baer and Gray, 1996)
.4 An 
effective bankruptcy law can provide a credible threat to management to commit to and honor 
fixed debt repayments, as a failure to do so may force  managers out and trigger the  exit of firms.  
The disciplining effect of debt is also conditional on the presence of an active takeover market 
that forces managers to issue debt in order to prevent loss of control to the potential acquirer, and 
by doing so, managers, by Jensen’s control hypothesis, are forced to avoid overinvestment 
(Zwiebel, 1996; Novaes and Zingales, 1995).  In situations where debt can be strategically issued 
by inside owners for expropriation,  it is argued that  incentives for such  expropriation can be 
weakened by effective capital market and other corporate governance institutions. Where such 
institutions are ineffective, or bankruptcy laws are weakly implemented, or where accounting and 
disclosure practices are not well defined, leverage can be used more effectively by the firms’ 
insider shareholders as a device for expropriation since outside minority shareholders and 
external providers of finance are likely to have less or inaccurate information about a 
corporation’s capital structure and its other operational details (Baer and Gray, 1996; Day and 
Taylor, 2004; Faccio et al., 2001).  Finally, as Day and Taylor (2004) argue, the effectiveness of 
governance through debt critically depends on the cost and quality of enforcement of debt 
contracts, which in turn depends on an appropriate legal environment, reliable drawing up of 
contracts and the faith in the judicial process. 
 
Existing empirical studies on the role of debt in corporate governance, as stated in the 
introduction, have been mostly confined to evaluating the role of debt in reducing agency costs 
and impacting firm value in developed market settings, particularly with respect to widely held 
corporations in the US (Harvey et al., 2004). The findings of these studies are varied, some 
confirming the disciplining role of leverage (for example, McConnell and Servaes, 1995) and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
little more than one third of the firms in even the richest countries are widely held. 
4 For instance, Hart and Moore (1994) explicitly model the idea  that debt is a contract that gives the 
creditor the right to repossess collateral in case of default and the threat  of such liquidation forces debtors 
to pay out to  creditors. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe, Hart and Moore’s model shows exactly 
how the schedule of debt repayments depend on what creditors can realize once they gain control.  
  8some finding no evidence to that effect (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).
5 Among  the few empirical 
studies existing outside the institutional context of the US and where corporations with 
concentrated ownership and control largely exist,  the results predominantly point to the absence 
of a disciplining role of debt and the presence of expropriation through debt. While an analysis of 
the disciplining role of debt with respect to a sample of Dutch corporations (de Jong, 2002), as 
well as study on the same subject with Chinese corporations (Tian, 2005) finds no evidence of the 
disciplining role of leverage, other studies with respect to a cross-section of East Asian and 
European countries (Faccio et al., 2001) find evidence of expropriation through debt in 
corporations with concentrated ownership and control. The latter study particularly finds the level 
of such expropriation to be lower with respect to the European firms, the difference being 
attributed to the existence of better governance institutions in Europe. Additionally, a recent study 
of a sample of Korean and Indonesian corporations (Driffield et al., 2005) do find that higher 
voting rights as well as higher equity ownership have positive impact on leverage in family 
owned and managed corporations indicative of expropriation through debt. Finally, a cross-
country analysis by Harvey et al. (2004) in 18 emerging economies finds evidence of limited 
disciplining effect of debt with the strength of the effect depending on the nature of the debt 
capital. While certain types of debt capital, like international syndicated loans, are found to limit 
expropriation by managers or controlling insiders, domestic debt is found not to have any such 
impact. 
 
3.Institutional Framework of Debt Governance in India 
Given our objective of analyzing the disciplinary role of debt in the course of institutional 
transition, it is instructive to highlight the institutional structure underlying debt governance in 
India as well as the changes it has undergone in recent years. In line with our earlier discussion, 
we briefly touch upon the quality of corporate governance as reflected in shareholder and creditor 
rights, the state of the bankruptcy law, auditing, accounting and disclosure norms, as well as other 
channels through which financial institutions are able to monitor debt contracts in India.  
 
                                                           
5 For instance, McConnell and Servaes (1995) find a positive relationship between debt and firm value with 
respect to a sample of US companies that have low growth opportunities but excess cash flows implying 
that debt has a disciplining role and confirming Jensen’s control hypothesis for debt creation. On the other 
hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) do not find any relationship between debt and firm value with respect 
to another sample of US corporates after controlling for other alternative corporate control mechanisms 
such as equity holding  by large shareholders, and the proportion of outside directors on company boards, 
and the interdependence among these mechanisms.   
  9Debt has always played a critical role in corporate financing and financial sector development in 
India. This has been the case in spite of the development and growth of the country’s capital 
market since the early nineties when financial sector reforms were initiated. Table 1 gives trends 
in financial development and the evolving financial structure in India since the 1990s. Following 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) we take market capitalization to GDP ratio as an indicator of 
size and value traded to GDP as an indicator of activity of the stock market. Along similar lines, 
we take assets of scheduled commercial banks and development financial institutions to GDP as 
an indicator of size and the ratio of non-food credit to GDP as an indicator of activity (defined to 
include scheduled commercial banks and development financial institutions) in the debt market. 
In terms of financial structure we observe that the banking sector to be relatively more important 
than the stock market in India as judged by their relative size. Though the relative size of the 
banking sector decreased in the initial years of the reforms program, its importance has again 
increased in the later years and the economy has remained largely bank-based as was the case 
prior to the reforms. Firm level studies corroborate the importance of debt in capital structure, 
with studies documenting that nearly four-fifths of total external funds being accounted for by 
borrowings and current liabilities and provisions, with major part of borrowings coming from 
banks and development finance institutions (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2001). 
 
Considering the state of corporate governance institutions in India, the Indian corporate 
governance system is by and large a hybrid of the “outsider systems” of the US and UK, and the 
“insider systems” of continental Europe and Japan (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000).  Equity holdings by 
non-financial corporations, which are primarily inter-corporate cross-holdings, are much higher 
than that in the US and UK and are more comparable to that in Germany and Japan. However, at 
the same time, the participation of the small investor in corporate equity is at comparable levels 
with the US, with India having the largest number of listed companies in the world.  In addition, 
while different types of financial institutions separately hold much smaller blocks in comparison 
to those in other countries, given that nearly all of these institutions are government controlled 
and fall under the aegis of the Ministry of Finance, together they form a much bigger 
homogeneous block in India than that in other countries. The participation of institutional 
investors like mutual funds and insurance companies which are nearly fully owned by the 
government in India is also significant, and comparable to the extent of their participation in 
Japan and Germany, but much less in scope than that in the US.  
 
  10Table 2 presents the relative ranking of countries in terms of important elements of corporate 
governance system, namely the extent of shareholder protection, creditor rights, accounting and 
disclosure norms and the efficiency of legal institutions. The Table shows India to be very much 
at par with developed countries, especially with the English law countries, UK and the US, with 
respect to minority investors and creditors rights. What is especially interesting from the point of 
view of minority investors is the comparable rank of India with that of the US and UK with 
respect to anti-directors rights and oppressed minority mechanisms. With regard to creditor rights, 
India is at par with UK and has more protective laws in the books than either the US, Japan, or 
Germany. In recent years, creditor rights have been further strengthened by giving powers of 
enforcement of securities to the banks and financial institutions.  The fact that many of the 
important governance institutions are at par with other common law countries is not surprising 
given the long history of governance institutions in India dating back to the mid-nineteenth 
century and the fact that most of the related legislation were fashioned around the English law.  
 
One of the areas where India relatively lags behind relative to particularly the US and UK is with 
respect to accounting and disclosure norms. Not only is the number of auditors per 100,000 in 
India significantly low at 9 compared to as high as 352 in the case of UK, the disclosure level as 
well as the opacity in accounting clearly lags behind the best practices in the developed countries. 
However, if one examines the progress of reforms in India since the early nineties with respect to 
corporate disclosures, accounting and auditing norms, it is clearly evident that substantial 
progress has been made in making corporate activities more transparent. For instance, with regard 
to legislative initiatives, the Government of India has sought to amend from time to time, the 
Companies Act, 1956, to ensure that the interests of shareholders and creditors continue to be 
protected in a changing economic environment. Several amendments have taken place in the 
nineties, with the most recent ones coming through the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2000 and 
the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2001. Some of the most recent amendments include, among 
others, buy-back of securities, relaxation in norms relating to inter-corporate loans and 
investments, setting up of Investor Education and Protection Fund, compliance of accounting 
standards in preparation of annual accounts, provision for postal ballot, Audit Committee, 
Directors Responsibility Statement, Secretarial Compliance Certificate, and a ten fold increase of 
fines and the option for election of a director by small shareholders. Along with initiatives taken 
under the Companies Act, 1956, important initiatives taken up by the capital market regulator 
SEBI with respect to listed companies, have specifically focused on greater extent of corporate 
disclosures and transparency. Apart from the fact that from 2001, all listed companies have been 
  11progressively required to publish corporate governance reports and submit annual accounts 
quarterly, listing agreement requires companies to file every quarter detailed data on corporate 
ownership structure including identities of shareholders holding at least one per cent equity. 
Finally, listed companies are required to present consolidated accounts, follow segment reporting 
and disclose related party transactions. It is important to note that most of the reforms in 
corporate governance and disclosures have been instituted post 2000 after several important 
corporate governance committees were set up by the Government as well as by SEBI.
6  
 
A core issue in designing an effective bank-based governance mechanism is with regard to 
bankruptcy laws.  Insolvency laws in India, derived largely from English law, are contained in the 
Companies Act, 1956 and provides for liquidation and restructuring. The process of winding up 
of companies is undertaken under the supervision of the court. Further, there are mechanisms for 
pre-insolvency workouts whereby under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 
1985, companies with eroded net worth are sought to be rehabilitated.
7 This Act is administered 
by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, and the provisions allow either a sick 
company or banks and other financial institutions which are creditors to the company to report its 
condition to the board. The board consequently judges whether the potential for rehabilitating the 
company exists as well as the appropriate course of action to be taken to avoid insolvency. Pre-
insolvency workout schemes are also undertaken under the Corporate Debt Restructuring Scheme 
and Asset Reconstruction under Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI). The Recovery of Debts due to Banks 
and Financial Institutons (Amendment) Act, 2002, allows summary attachment of property of 
defaulting borrower at the time of filing the complaint and empowers the Debt Recovery 
Tribunals to distribute sales proceeds among secured creditors, and other mechanisms intended to 
speed up recovery of debts and thereby help reduce non-performing assets (NPAs).  
  
Finally, given that one of the sources of managerial discipline and the incentive to bond through 
debt is the presence of an active takeover market, it is important to highlight the fact that during 
                                                           
6 In India,   the first regulatory initiative towards mandating the constitution of independent boards  for 
listed companies followed the adoption by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in February 
2000 of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee (KMBC) recommendations on  corporate governance. 
Since then other committees have been set up from time to time to evaluate the progress of  these reforms, 
such as the setting up of  Naresh Chandra Committee on  Corporate Audit and Governance (NCC)  in 2002 
by the Department of Company Affairs in 2002  and the the Narayana Murthy Committee on Corporate 
Governance by SEBI in 2002. 
7 A sick industrial company  is defined as one that has incurred losses in consecutive years and whose asset 
to liability ratio had fallen below 1.1).  
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The market for corporate control in India, although technically existent for a long time, has been 
rather inactive by US and UK standards, but certainly more active relative to the markets in Japan 
and Germany. Prior to the economic reforms, regulatory bodies like the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) placed several hurdles in the way of takeovers, mergers and 
amalgamations. Moreover, in the event of a hostile bid for a company, incumbent managers had 
the power to refuse transfer of shares to the bidder if the transfer was against the interests of the 
company or against public interest. The first attempts at regulating takeovers in India were made 
in a limited way by incorporating a clause, viz.  Clause 40, in the listing agreement that provided 
for making a public offer to the shareholders of a company by any person who sought to acquire 
25 percent or more of the voting rights of the company. Currently, takeovers are regulated 
through the Substantial Acquisitions of Shares and Takeovers Regulations, first promulgated in 
1994 by the SEBI, and then replaced by a more comprehensive act in 1997. Current regulations, 
by making disclosure of substantial acquisitions mandatory, have sought to ensure that the equity 
of a firm does not covertly change hands between the acquirer and the promoters. Moreover, the 
rights of existing management to withhold transfer of shares have been withdrawn, although 
under Sections 250 and 409 of the Companies Act, target companies can shelter against raiders if 
the proposed transfer prejudicially affects the interests of the company.  Following these reforms, 
substantial increase in takeover activity has taken place in India in the recent years. For example, 
while 40 open offers valued at US$ 134.31 million took place in 1998, there were 88 open offers 
in 2003, valued at US$ 1483.25 million (SEBI website, 2005). 
 
4. Hypotheses and Sample 
4.1 Hypotheses 
Our main objective in this paper is to test whether debt plays a disciplining role in mitigating 
agency costs in firms where such costs are likely to be relatively high. As McConell and Servaes 
(1995) argue, debt could have both a positive effect on firm value by curbing over investment in 
negative net present value projects (Jensen, 1986) as well as a negative effect when firms have to 
forego profitable investment opportunities because of prior debt commitments (Myers, 1977). 
Given that both the positive and negative effects of debt are likely to be present in firms, 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) conjecture that the positive effect of debt is likely to outweigh the 
negative effects in firms with low growth opportunities whereas the opposite is likely to happen 
in firms with high growth opportunities. Analyzing the effect of debt separately for samples of 
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for their hypotheses. 
 
Taking the McConnell and Servaes hypotheses as the baseline, we examine in the context of a 
sample of Indian firms, first, whether the disciplinary effect of debt exists in firms with low 
growth opportunities where managers are prone to over invest in negative net present value 
projects. Second, we extend this analysis to examine whether the disciplinary effect of debt, if 
any, is different for group affiliated and standalone firms. As discussed earlier, group affiliated 
firms in India as in many other countries, have concentrated ownership and control structures 
with affiliates within a group being organized as pyramids (Bertrand et al., 2002). This is not the 
case with standalone firms where there is little divergence between promoter’s share ownership 
and control. Given that the ownership structure in group firms can potentially facilitate 
expropriation through debt, one can conjecture that for firms with low growth opportunities, debt 
could have less of a disciplinary effect, if any, in firms which are affiliated to groups. This could 
be all the more in the absence of appropriate institutions like transparent accounting and 
disclosure norms that can camouflage any form of expropriation that takes place among the 
network of group affiliates. However, if capital markets are functioning, investors would factor in 
the possibility for expropriation through debt by imputing a lower market value to group affiliates 
vis-à-vis standalones. Over time, if institutions develop in the form of better monitoring by 
creditors, better disclosure rules about related party transactions and the like, so as to make 
explicit expropriation through debt to become more costly. In response, firms are likely to react to 
improve their market valuation. Hence, one would expect a narrowing of or elimination of the 
market discount for group affiliated firms vis-à-vis standalone firms over time. In other words, if 
debt is used as a disciplinary device by shareholders to mitigate agency costs, external 
institutional pressures may operate to narrow down the discount between standalones and group 
affiliates, notwithstanding the expropriation incentives through debt in the latter. 
 
4.2 Sample 
An analysis of the above questions requires good quality data on (i) the financial structure of the 
company (ii) its accounting and market performance (iii) its ownership pattern (iv) the nature of 
its affiliation with other corporate bodies, particularly group affiliated companies, and (v) the type 
and composition of its management. For our analysis, we use the PROWESS dataset published by 
the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). PROWESS is a comprehensive database 
containing good time series information (from 1990 onwards) on a large number of companies 
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reports of companies, (b) their market performance, including, but not limited to, stock price and 
trading volume, (c) their equity ownership pattern, (d) affiliation to business group classified into 
top50 business group, large business group, and other business group.  
 
The PROWESS database gives the extent of equity ownership by different types of shareholders, 
namely by directors and relatives, by corporate bodies, by foreign bodies including institutional 
investors, by financial institutions, by mutual funds, by insurance companies, and by public. 
While such data for each blockholder was available as aggregates, since 2002, listed companies 
were required by SEBI to report equity data at a more disaggregated level. Thus, companies were 
required not only to report aggregate ownership under each blockholder, they were required to 
file the identity of all shareholders under each block, holding at least one per cent of equity. In 
our analysis, while we use aggregate data for all the three years, we use the disaggregated data for 
additional analysis for 2003, the first year in which the data was available. 
 
Our sample consists of all listed private sector Indian manufacturing companies. We have three 
sets of samples for the three years of our analysis. The 1996 sample consists of 1,211 companies 
of which 714 are standalones and 497 are group affiliates. The 2000 sample comprises of 1024 
companies of which 564 are standalones and 460 are group affiliates. Finally, the 2003 sample 
consists of a total of 1266 companies of which 697 are standalones and 569 are group affiliates. 
 
5. Empirical Methodology and Results 
5.1 Empirical methodology 
In line with our hypotheses, and following the methodology applied by McConnell and Servaes 
(1995), we identify low growth firms as those with price-earnings (P/E) ratio below the median in 
the respective years. Firms above the median are identified as high growth firms. The P/E ratio is 
calculated by dividing the stock price at the end of years 1996, 2000 and 2003 by operating 
earnings per share.  
 
In estimating the effect of debt on market value, we adopt a simultaneous equation framework in 
line with several existing studies (for example, Driffield et al. 2005; de Jong 2002) which argue in 
favor of a joint determination of debt and firm performance as opposed to a single equation 
framework (McConnell and Servaes, 1995) that does not allow for reverse causality from 
performance to debt. In the capital structure literature, leverage is usually considered to be 
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Watts, 1992; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). We estimate the following system of linear equations 
under two specifications. Under Specification 1, we estimate the following system of linear 
equations: 
 
market value = f(leverage, leverage x group, group-affiliation, ownership structure, firm     
  characteristics)  +  error     --  Equation  (1) 
leverage = g(market value, group-affiliation, free cash flow, risk,  
      non-tax debt shield) + error      -- Equation (2) 
 
Under Specification 2, we use a finer set of ownership and control variables to examine the 
disciplinary/expropriation effect of debt separately on standalones and group affiliates. These 
variables allow us to analyse more directly (compared to Specification 1) whether expropriation 
through debt takes place in group affiliates. The underlying hypothesis, following Faccio and 
Lang (2001) is that group affiliates with a higher degree of separation between ownership and 
control are likely to have higher debt ratios that would facilitate expropriation from firms with 
low cash flow rights to firms with high cash flow rights. As we explain later, using our available 
data, we construct different indices of potential expropriation to test the expropriation hypothesis. 
We also examine in this context whether firms that are more conducive to expropriation are 
discounted by the market in terms of lower market value.  This analysis is conducted only for 
2003 for which the detailed ownership variables are available.  
 
As stated earlier, since our primary focus is on the role of debt in mitigating the over investment 
problem, most of our analysis will be devoted to estimating the system of equations for low 
growth firms. However, in order to establish the discriminating nature of our results with respect 
to low growth firms, we estimate the model for high growth firms too and compare the estimates 
so obtained with that of low growth firms. 
 
The two endogenous variables in our model are leverage as measured by total debt as a 
proportion of total assets and market value as measured by Tobin’s Q.  Tobin’s Q is defined as the 
ratio of market value of equity and market value of debt to the replacement cost of assets. 
However, in India, as in many developing countries, the calculation of Tobin’s Q is difficult 
primarily because a large proportion of the corporate debt is institutional debt that is not actively 
traded in the debt market. Also, most companies report asset values to historical costs rather than 
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debt and the book value of assets in place of market values. This modified Tobin’s Q has been 
widely used in the literature to avoid arbitrary assumptions on depreciation and inflation rates. 
 
Among the main variables of interest in the Tobin’s Q equation (Equation 1) are leverage and the 
interaction term leverage* group affiliation. Group affiliation is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for firms affiliated to a group. If debt acts as a disciplinary effect in low growth 
firms, we would expect leverage to positively affect market value. However, given that there 
could be potential expropriation through debt in group affiliated firms, one would expect the 
disciplinary effect of debt to be lower in group affiliates relative to standalones. If that is the case, 
then the coefficient of leverage x group affiliation will turn out to be negative. Apart from the 
effect of leverage, the other set of variables of interest in the valuation equation are the equity 
ownership variables. We include three equity ownership variables that are relevant in the Indian 
context (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000), namely ownership by promoters or insiders, ownership by 
banks and financial institutions, and ownership by foreign investors. As is widely discussed in the 
literature on corporate ownership and performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the relationship 
between equity ownership and performance is ambiguous and cannot be predicted a priori. The 
benefits of blockholdings by equity owners as promoters and financial institutions are highlighted 
under the “convergence-of-interest” and the “efficient-monitoring” hypotheses which argue that 
higher equity stakes increases the returns from monitoring, thereby reducing agency costs and 
increasing company value. On the other hand, under the “conflict-of-interest” hypothesis and the 
“strategic-alignment” hypothesis, shareholders, particularly insiders, with higher equity stakes 
may pursue non-profit maximizing objectives for their personal benefits to the detriment of the 
minority, and different types of large shareholders like institutional investors and managers may 
often find it mutually advantageous to collude in a way to reduce company value and hurt the 
interests of minority investors. The equity ownership variables that we include as explanatory 
variables are share ownership by promoters (promoters’ share ownership), share ownership by 
financial institutions (financial institutions’ share ownership) and share ownership by foreign 
investors (foreign share ownership). 
 
Equation (1) also includes some standard control variables that are considered to impact market 
value. In keeping with earlier work we include, log of total assets (log of total assets) as proxy for 
size, and intangible assets namely advertising intensity (advertising intensity) defined as 
proportion of advertisement expenses to total assets and research and development intensity 
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addition, all regressions are controlled for industry effects through the incorporation of industry 
specific dummy variables. 
 
With respect to the determinants of leverage, we primarily focus on its relationship with 
promoters’ share ownership as well as its relationship with a firm’s excess cash flow. In low 
growth firms where the potential for overinvestment exists, managers with higher equity 
ownership would particularly have the incentive to issue more debt to signal their commitment to 
not divert excess cash flows for perquisite consumption. In other words, in line with Grossman 
and Hart, managers with higher equity ownership would have higher incentive to use debt as a 
bonding device. These incentives could be relevant both for standalone companies with 
professional management as well as owner-managed group affiliates. Additionally as Claessens et 
al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2001) argue, in group affiliates characterized by separation of 
ownership and control, controlling shareholders would have an incentive to issue more debt in 
order to avoid diluting their ownership stakes and thereby retain control. 
 
With regard to the relationship between firm’s excess cash flows and leverage, as argued by 
Jensen (1986), the potential for overinvestment exists particularly for low growth firms with free 
cash flows that allow managers to indulge in perquisite consumption and the like. If debt is used 
as a disciplining device in such firms, one would expect excess cash flows and debt to be 
positively related. We therefore control for free cash flows (free cash flow) in the leverage 
equation. We measure cash flows using the proxy introduced by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) where 
the variable equals operating income minus taxes, interest expenditures and dividends paid 
divided by total assets. 
 
Among the control variables included in the leverage equation is non-debt tax shields (non-debt 
tax shield) defined as operating income minus interest payments and minus tax payments over the 
corporate tax rate as a proportion of total assets (Titman and Wessels, 1988). As argued in the 
capital structure literature, the existence of non-debt tax shields make the issuing of debt 
relatively less attractive and hence we hypothesize that non-debt tax shields to be negatively 
related to leverage. Additional control variables are bankruptcy risk (risk), proxied by a dummy 
variable which equals 1 for firms in the bottom decile of the of the interest coverage ratio (Faccio 
and Lang, 2001), firm size, as measured by log of total assets, group affiliation, Tobin’s Q, and 
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variables and their definitions are summarized in Table 3. 
 
5.2 Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics for our sample of firms are presented in Tables 4(a) – 4(e). Table 4(a) 
presents the statistics for the full sample for each year to analyse whether there have been any 
significant changes in the characteristics between the years. Table 4(b) presents the statistics for 
the full sample of firms for each of the three years, 1996, 2000 and 2003, classified by ownership 
groups. Table 4(c) presents the statistics for the full sample for the three years of our study 
classified by high growth and low growth firms. Finally, Table 4(d) presents the statistics for the 
sub-sample of only low growth firms classified by ownership groups. Finally, Table 4(e) presents 
the statistics for the sub-sample of only high growth firms classified by ownership groups. 
 
Table 4(a) presents relevant summary statistic for the full sample in each year comprises of both 
low growth and high growth firms across both ownership groups. The means test for the key 
variables is carried out in comparison with the earliest year in our sample, 1996. As is evident 
from Table 4(a), compared to 1996, both the price-earnings ratio and Tobin’s Q did not change 
significantly in 2000, but were significantly lower in 2003. Further while debt ratios measured 
either in terms of long term leverage or in terms of total leverage remained the same in 1996 and 
2000, these declined significantly in 2003 over the 1996 level. These trends coincided with a 
decline in free cash flow in the later years. Finally, estimates of promoters share ownership and 
ownership by dispersed shareholders (public share ownership) show that while there has been 
significant consolidation of promoter holdings in later years, in particular in 2000, there has been 
a dilution of share ownership by outsiders. What Table 4(a) essentially highlights is that the key 
characteristics of listed firms have undergone significant changes during the period of our study 
suggesting a variation of data over time. 
 
While Table 4(a) is broadly indicative of the changes, Table 4(b) reveals differences in the key 
characteristics by ownership groups across the years. As is evident from Table 6(b), while group 
affiliate firms have significantly lower price-earnings ratios on the average as compared to stand 
alones, they have higher market value as measured by Tobin’s Q.  Further, group affiliates have 
significantly higher debt ratios, higher equity ownership by financial institutions and by foreign 
investors. What is notable however, is that while there is no significant difference in the 
promoter’s ownership between group affiliates and standalones, significant differences exist with 
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dispersed shareholdings as compared to group affiliates. These differences essentially arise 
because other blockholders of equity, namely financial institutions and foreign investors have 
significantly higher equity ownership in group affiliates. With regard to free cash flow, there is no 
particular pattern of difference between the two ownership groups with free cash flow of group 
affiliates as compared to stand alones being higher in 1996, lower in 2000 and same in 2003. 
 
When we split the sample for each year by high and low growth firms as is presented in Table 
4(c), we can the differences in the price-earnings ratio of high and low growth firms are 
“dramatic”, by construction.  Similarly, the average Tobin's Q for high growth firms is 
significantly higher for the high growth firms. What we additionally find is that the low growth 
firms have systematically higher debt ratios than their high growth counterparts for all the three 
years. These implicitly imply that high debt ratios are likely to be a constraining factor for high 
growth firms and a mitigating factor with respect to agency problems present in low growth 
firms. With regard to equity ownership, we find that while there is no significant difference in 
ownership by promoters, high growth firms have significantly lower holdings by financial 
institutions and higher holdings by foreign investors. The higher equity ownership by financial 
institutions in low growth firms can be explained by the need to monitor such firms in which 
these institutions have debt exposure and where the potential for overinvestment exists, whereas 
the higher foreign equity ownership in high growth firms can be explained by the incentives of 
foreign investors to maximize their returns on equity. 
 
When we consider only low growth firms and analyze averages of key variables across group 
affiliates and standalones (Table 4(d)), several of the differences in the characteristics of 
ownership groups that we noticed in the full sample in Table 4(b) hold true. Within the low 
growth firms too, both long term leverage and total leverage are significantly higher for group 
affiliates in all the three years. It is not a priori clear from the summary statistics whether higher 
long term borrowing in low growth firms is indicative of a need to use debt as a commitment 
device to mitigate agency problems or use it for purpose of expropriation. Also, as with respect to 
the full sample, equity ownership by both financial institutions and foreign investors are higher 
for group affiliates as compared to standalones. While a higher equity ownership by financial 
institutions in group affiliates can be due to higher debt exposure, higher ownership by foreign 
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standalones.  
 
Finally, Table 4(e) presents the summary statistics of high growth firms by ownership groups. As 
is the case of low growth firms, similar differences between standalones and group affiliates exist 
with respect to high growth firms. However, what is interesting is that leverage in high growth 
firms are lower for each ownership group as compared to their low growth counterparts. Also, in 
spite of being high growth firms, equity ownership by financial institutions is lower in these firms 
as compared low growth firms which strengthens our contention that the higher equity holding of 
financial institutions is largely motivated by the need to monitoring the low growth firms rather 
than by the need to earn higher returns on their investments. 
 
5.3 Empirical Results 
As stated earlier, we analyze the determinants of leverage and Tobin’s Q in a simultaneous 
equation framework. The regression equations are estimated by 2SLS rather than 3SLS. Since our 
primarily focus is in estimating the valuation regression i.e., Tobin’s Q, we prefer to use single 
equations method to guard against possible inconsistency of estimates due to misspecification of 
the leverage equation. For each of the three years, the determinants of Tobin’s Q and leverage are 
presented in Tables 5(a) and Table 5(b), respectively. 
 
5.3.1 Debt and Performance: Low Growth 
As is evident from the estimations of the pooled model presented in Table 5(a), as of 1996, 
leverage, has no significant effect on a company’s market value. Neither does the effect of 
leverage on Tobin’s Q depend on the group affiliation of the firms. Thus, there is no evidence of 
any disciplinary effect of debt in low growth firms both with respect to standalones and group 
affiliates. This picture however is quite different four years later in 2000 with leverage being 
found to be positively related to Tobin’s Q in standalones with a p-value of less than 0.0001. As 
has been argued in existing studies, this positive effect of debt on market valuation for low 
growth firms is indicative of the disciplinary role of debt in mitigating the agency costs associated 
with overinvestment. In the case of group affiliates in contrast, the negative and significant 
coefficient of leverage*group affiliation for 2000 suggests that the market discounts the 
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disciplinary effect on group affiliates too, albeit to a lesser extent. This is because the total effect 
of debt on group affiliates, computed as a summation of the coefficients of leverage and 
leverage*group affiliation, is positive (0.26) and significant with a p-value of 0.06. Thus, while 
the incentive structure of group affiliates arising out of the concentration of both ownership and 
management in the hands of the founding promoters do not predicate a priori the necessity for 
using debt as a disciplining device to signal the market, our estimates suggest that group affiliates 
are nevertheless perceived by the market as using debt as a commitment or bonding device 
although to a lesser extent.  
If we consider year 2003, estimates in Table 5(a) reveal that debt continues to have a disciplinary 
effect on standalones with the coefficient of leverage being 0.82 and significant at less than 
0.0001. Further, as in the case of year 2000, we find that the disciplinary effect of debt continues 
to be discounted for group affiliates as is evident from the negative and significant coefficient of 
leverage*group affiliation. Again, the net effect of debt on group affiliates in the year 2003 as 
reflected in the summation of the coefficients of leverage  and  leverage*group affiliation is 
positive (0.44) and significant with a p-value of 0.004.  Additionally, judging by the fact that the 
net effect on group affiliates in 2003 is higher at 0.44 compared to 0.26 in 2000 implies that the 
disciplinary effect of debt on group affiliates is stronger in 2003 and the discount associated with 
group affiliates vis-à-vis standalones is lower. This is likely to be due to a combination of factors. 
On the one hand, as market institutions like the capital market and the takeover market develop 
due to more transparent regulations and bankruptcy procedures become effective as we have seen 
in the case of India, managers even in group affiliates become increasingly subjected to market 
pressures. On the other hand, with reforms in accounting, auditing and disclosure norms, 
operations of group affiliates can be expected to become more transparent implying a decrease in 
the market discount. 
 
With regard to the ownership variables, estimates in Table 5(a) reveal that while promoters’ 
share ownership has no significant effect on Tobin’s Q in all the three years of our analysis, while 
financial institutions’ share ownership has a positive and significant effect on Tobin’s Q in 1996 
and 2000 and no effect in 2003. Incorporating a quadratic effect with respect to promoters’ share 
ownership keeps the results unchanged suggesting the absence of a non-linear relationship 
between market value and insider ownership as is found in several existing studies with respect to 
US  (McConnell and Servaes. 1995; Morck et al., 1988) as well as in India (Sarkar and Sarkar, 
  222000). Foreign share ownership by and large has a positive and significant effect on company 
value as is revealed by the positive and significant coefficients in 1996 and 2003.  
Turning our attention to the determinants of leverage in Table 5(b), we find free cash flow to have 
a positive and significant effect on leverage successively in 1996 and 2000 indicating that 
companies with higher excess cash flows have taken on higher levels of debt. Going by the 
results with respect to the effect of debt on market value (Table 5(a)), while the diversion of 
increased excess cash flows to increased debt commitments did not translate into higher market 
value in 1996, it did so in 2000. In 2003 however, no relationship between free cash flow and 
leverage is found, although leverage does have a disciplinary effect once free cash flow is 
controlled for.  The effect of non-debt tax shield on leverage is negative and significant in all the 
three years as expected. With regards to the effect of promoters’ share ownership the hypothesis 
that firms with higher insider holdings would have an incentive to issue higher levels of debt to 
prevent dilution of control is validated weakly in 1996 (p-value of 0.09), but not in other years. 
An interaction of promoters’ share ownership with group affiliation to find out whether the non-
dilution motive is particularly stronger in group affiliates in any of the years do not turn out to be 
significant (not reported in Table 5(b)). The consistently positive and significant effect of Tobin’s 
Q on leverage that we find for the low growth firms is consistent with earlier findings by 
researchers that firm performance affects leverage choice due to lowering of bankruptcy risks.  
With regard to the effect of tangible assets (asset tangibility) on leverage, estimates in Table 5(b) 
reveal a positive and significant relationship in 1996 and 2000 but ceases to matter in 2003. The 
results for the earlier years are consistent with the arguments that higher tangible assets can 
reduce the agency costs of debt by providing collateral value (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). With 
respect to the effect of bankruptcy risk (risk) on leverage, while one would expect higher risk of 
bankruptcy to have a detrimental effect on the debt ratio (Harris and Raviv, 1990), our estimates 
on risk do not reveal any significant effect for 1996 and 2003. However, contrary to expectations, 
risk does have a positive and significant effect on debt ratio in 2000. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Ross (1977) and Harris and Raviv (1990) who find that leverage is positively 
related to the probability of default.  
An interesting point to note with respect to our estimation is that the explanatory power of the 
model both with respect to the Tobin’s Q and the leverage equation increases monotonically over 
the years. The increase is particularly striking with respect to the Tobin’s Q equation. While in 
1996 the model explains only 6 per cent of total variation in the dependent variable, this rises to 
14 percent in 2000 and to 39 per cent in 2003. Thus, an application of the model largely 
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emerging economy like India in the course of its transition to more market oriented institutions.  
The results that we have reported so far are based on the pooled regression of group affiliated and 
standalones firms. In this model, we included a group affiliation dummy and its interaction with 
leverage in Tobin’s Q to examine whether the disciplinary effect is sensitive to ownership 
structures.  However, in this model we did not allow for group effects in other variables of 
interest like those with respect to the equity ownership variables in the Tobin’s Q equation, and 
free cash flow, risk and non-debt tax shield in the leverage equation. In order to examine whether 
there are significant differences in the effects of these variables across ownership groups as well 
as check the robustness of our results with respect to leverage, we estimated the two equations 
separately for standalones and group affiliates.  
Our estimation results for the Tobin’s Q equation confirmed the findings of the pooled model of 
an absence of a disciplinary effect in 1996 for both ownership categories, and the presence of 
such an effect in 2000 and 2003. With regard to the effect of equity ownership on Tobin’s Q, 
promoters’ share ownership did not have any significant effect on firm value for both standalones 
and group affiliates in most scenarios except for in the case of group affiliates in 2000 where it 
was positively and weakly significant with a p-value of 0.08. The effects of other ownership 
variables were consistent with the results in the pooled model. With regard to the determinants of 
leverage, run separately for standalones and group affiliates, the effect of non-debt tax shield 
remained uniformly negative by ownership groups, though the magnitude of the effect was higher 
for group affiliates. Excess cash flows had a positive and significant effect consistently for all the 
three years for group affiliates and for standalones for the first two years. Finally, as in the case of 
the pooled analysis, the explanatory power of the performance equation monotonically increased 
over the years both for standalones and group affiliates. A F-test designed to examine the 
appropriateness of the parsimonious specification with interaction vis-à-vis the separate models 
for standalones and group-affiliates failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level. We 
prefer to present the pooled model with interaction terms as it provides a more parsimonious 
specification wherein the differential effects of leverage on firm value is easier to illustrate and its 
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As discussed in the introduction, debt can have either a positive or negative effect on firm value 
depending on the presence of low or high growth opportunities facing the firm. Our estimation 
results with respect to low growth firms show that debt can be used as a device for mitigating 
agency problems even in emerging economies and in firms where the potential for expropriation 
through debt particularly exist, i.e., group affiliates. However, to demonstrate the discriminating 
power of our model in the case of low growth firms, it is important to analyze the effect of debt in 
the case of high growth firms and find out whether the relationship between debt and 
performance is any different in this case. As McConnell and Servaes (1995) argue, in the case of 
high growth firms, it is likely that the negative effect of debt on company value following from 
the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977) will outweigh any positive effect that debt may have 
in these firms. Given very little evidence on this issue with respect to high growth firms in 
emerging economies and to examine whether there are substantial differences in the effect of debt 
by growth opportunities, we estimate the relationship between leverage and Tobin’s Q for the 
high growth sample. A F-test designed to examine the appropriateness of the parsimonious 
specification that we had adopted for the low growth sample to examine ownership effects, 
rejects the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level. Accordingly, we estimate the model separately 
for standalone and group affiliated firms to allow for differences in coefficients of all the 
explanatory variables. The results are presented in Tables 6(a) and 6(b). 
 
With respect to the Tobin’s Q equation, as is evident from Tables 6(a), the effect of leverage is 
quite the opposite for high growth firms, both in the case of standalones and group affiliates. In 
the case of standalones, leverage has a negative and significant effect on Tobin’s Q in 1996 and 
2000, with p-values of 0.0120 and 0.0002 respectively. In the case of group affiliates, this 
negative effect consistently persists in all the three years with p-values of 0.0089, 0024 and 
0.0152, respectively. These results, implying that debt commitments in high growth firms force 
firms to forego positive present value projects, are distinct from the results with respect to low 
growth firms and are consistent with that obtained by McConnell and Servaes in the case of US 
companies. If we compare the magnitude of the marginal effects of leverage across standalones 
and group affiliates, for each year, the effects in absolute terms are significantly higher (with p-
values of 0.0001) for group affiliates as compared to standalones. Thus, our estimates imply that 
the underinvestment problem is particularly stronger for group affiliates and essentially follows 
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revealed in the summary statistics presented earlier. 
 
With regard to the determinants of leverage (Table 6(b)) in high growth firms, while the direction 
of effects of the explanatory variables are similar to those in low growth firms, the significance of 
the variables are in some cases different if one compares by ownership groups and by year. One 
notable difference with respect to low growth firms lies in the fact that while the effect of Tobin’s 
Q is found to be consistently positive across the years, there is by and large no such effect with 
respect to high growth firms. Also, in the case of high growth standalones, firms with excess cash 
flows consistently have higher leverage, this is not the case with respect to the group affiliates 
except for 2003. Finally, the effect of promoters’ share ownership on leverage is consistently 
positive and significant for high growth group affiliates in contrast to being not significantly zero 
in the case of standalones implying that the promoters in group affiliates are more interested in 
preserving their control and preventing the “dilution of entrenchment” in high growth firms.  
 
 6. Debt and Expropriation 
Our foregoing analysis while examining the disciplinary effect of debt in low growth firms did 
not focus explicitly on the issue of whether debt is also used as an expropriation mechanism 
especially in group affiliates.  However, our results of a discount in the disciplinary effect of debt 
of group affiliates vis-à-vis standalones provide some indirect evidence of possible expropriation 
in the former group of firms. As has been discussed extensively in the literature on business 
groups, the incentives of inside shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders in group firms 
organized as pyramids is directly related to the divergence of ownership and control rights in 
these firms. The higher the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights in group 
affiliates, the higher is the incentive of the controlling shareholder to divert resources from 
affiliates where the cash flow rights are lower, to firms where the cash flow rights are higher.  As 
we have discussed earlier in Sections 1 and 2, one of the channels through which controlling 
shareholders can expropriate is through committing higher leverage in companies with greater 
separation of ownership and control. If debt facilitates expropriation and the capital structure 
decisions of firms are not fully driven by the concerns of external creditors and minority 
shareholders, then as Faccio and Lang (2001) argue, firms with higher divergence of ownership 
and control are likely to issue more debt and thereby generate more resources to be expropriated 
  26by controlling shareholders. Thus, affiliates which are more vulnerable to expropriation would 
have higher levels of debt. 
 
We test the hypothesis that higher levels of debt are associated with higher vulnerability of 
expropriation notwithstanding the disciplining effect that debt may also have in firms which can 
be potentially expropriated. Thus, we adapt our model under Specification 1 to explicitly control 
for an indicator of expropriation in the performance equation as well as in the debt equation. If 
debt ratios are higher in firms that are more vulnerable to expropriation, then such expropriation 
is likely to have a negative effect on firm value. Whether the disciplining effect of debt on firms 
still hold after controlling for expropriation is an open question that we empirically analyze.  
 
In order to compute an index of expropriation vulnerability, a standard variable that is constructed 
in several studies is the ratio of cash flow rights to control rights (see for example Claessens et al., 
2000, Faccio and Lang, 2001). However, while data on the direct cash flow rights of the 
controlling shareholder is easily available, computing the control rights involves identifying the 
weakest link in each control chain linking a group affiliate to its controlling shareholder.  Such 
computation is largely infeasible in the case of many firms even if detailed ownership data on 
shareholders are available as many of these shareholders are private limited companies on which 
further information on their ownership structure are not available in the public domain.  
 
One approach suggested in the literature to identify firms in the pyramid and their expropriation 
vulnerability is the direct cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder (Bertrand et al., 2002). 
Thus, firms with lower cash flow rights are identified as ones to likely have greater divergence 
between ownership and control and positioned lower in the pyramid. In our analysis, we suggest 
an alternative indicator of expropriation vulnerability which we term as the “ownership-opacity” 
indicator. The computation of this variable is based on the premise that complete information on 
the ownership stakes of the controlling shareholder(s) is not always available in the public 
domain. This primarily results from disclosure laws that require firms to disclose the identity of 
only large shareholders where a large shareholder is defined according to appropriate cut-off 
points. In India, SEBI regulations introduced in 2002 require listed companies to mandatorily 
require listed companies to disclose the identity of equity holders who have at least one per cent 
share ownership in the companies along with the value of such ownership and the number of 
shares held. Thus, while total shareholdings by promoters are disclosed and promoters with at 
least one per cent are disclosed, the difference in the two is accounted by all shareholders (if any) 
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no information on their identity or pattern of equity ownership. The more such divergence, the 
less we are likely to know the control and ownership structure of the controlling shareholders of 
the firm, and thus more opaque is the firm.  The implications of such ownership opacity are 
particularly strong for affiliates within a group which are connected by a complex web of cross-
holdings and pyramids. This is because, the less the information on the complete ownership and 
control structure of a firm, the more vulnerable it would be to expropriation as it would be easier 
to divert resources from the firm to other group members without being tracked down. Thus, if 
expropriation is the motive, then opacity of ownership can be strategically engineered through the 
fragmentation of shareholding. 
 
Applying our concept of ownership opacity, we construct three ownership opaqueness variables. 
As the disclosure of detailed ownership data on one percent shareholdings became mandatory 
only since 2003, we are able to compute these variables only for this year and not for the earlier 
years. Thus, our empirical estimation is confined to only the last year in our dataset and not the 
earlier years.  The definitions of these three variables are the following: 
 
ownership opacity (measure 1) = Total promoters’ share ownership from aggregate data 
minus total promoters’ share ownership from 1 percent data, divided by total promoters’ 
share ownership from aggregate data. 
 
ownership opacity (measure 2) = Total promoters’ share ownership obtained by 
aggregating separate holdings of 1 percent or more minus total promoters’ share 
ownership obtained by aggregating separate holdings of 5 percent or more, divided by 
total promoters’ share ownership obtained by aggregating separate holdings of 1 percent 
or more. 
 
ownership opacity (measure 3) = Total number of separate holdings by promoters of 1 
percent or more minus total number of separate holdings by promoters of 5 percent or 
more, divided by total number of separate holdings by promoters of 1 percent or more. 
 
While the first is the obvious measure of the divergence between total equity holdings and 
holdings by one percent or above shareholders, the next two measures attempt to capture the 
extent of fragmentation of promoter ownership among the equity owners for which information is 
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held by the relatively smaller shareholders with equity ownership of less than 5 per cent. These 
latter two measures thus provide an indicator of the fragmentation of equity ownership by 
controlling shareholders and persons acting in concert. Given that a large number of small equity 
owners are private limited companies that are controlled by the controlling shareholders, the more 
difficult is it to establish a chain of links from one firm to another firm.  
 
The summary statistics of the different ownership indices related to promoter control is presented 
in Table 7. As is evident from the Table, while there is no significant difference in the aggregate 
ownership of promoters between standalones and group affiliates, the disaggregated picture is 
significantly different for the two ownership groups.  While one would expect ownership opacity 
to be relatively more in group affiliates as compared to standalones given the intrinsic motives for 
diversion of resources in the latter, our estimates reveal that stand alones score higher than group 
affiliates in terms of opacity with respect to all the three indices.  
 
Tables 8(a) and 8(b) present the estimation results of the relationship between firm value and debt 
after controlling for opacity for standalones and group affiliates. As earlier, the regressions are 
estimated on the low growth sample. In Table 8(a), regression estimates are with respect to the 
determinants of firm value for standalones and group affiliates after incorporating the three 
opacity variables in our basic model. The important point to note from this Table is that leverage 
continues to have a positive and significant effect on Tobin’s Q for both standalones and group 
affiliates under all the three opacity measures. Thus, the results obtained in the pooled model 
(Table 5(a)) of the disciplinary effect of debt for the year 2003 continues to hold up even after 
controlling for ownership opacity. One noticeable change however is in the relative magnitude of 
the coefficients of leverage with respect to standalones and group affiliates. While our pooled 
model results earlier reveal a discount in the marginal effect of leverage for group affiliates 
relative to standalones, the picture is reversed once opacity is controlled for. As Table 8(a) 
reveals, the marginal effects of debt on Tobin’s Q is significantly higher for group affiliates 
relative to standalones. This implies that after controlling for opacity, the disciplinary effect of 
debt is stronger for group affiliates. 
 
With regard to the effect of opacity on Tobin’s Q, estimates in Table 8(a) show that none of the 
three opacity measures have any effect on market value in the case of standalones. This implies 
that while standalone firms on average have higher ownership opacity, such opacity is not 
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that the incentive or ability of controlling shareholders in standalone companies without any 
pyramidal structures do not exist. In contrast, ownership opacity (measure 2) and ownership 
opacity (measure 3) which capture the fragmentation of promoter ownership in firms have a 
negative and significant effect on Tobin’s Q for group affiliates. This is indicative of the fact that 
the market perceives that such fragmentation could be strategic and can potentially increase the 
vulnerability of a group affiliate to expropriation. 
 
With regard to the determinants of leverage after incorporating the opacity variables (Table 8(b)), 
we find that other than ownership opacity (measure 2), opacity variables have no effect on 
leverage. In the case of ownership opacity (measure 2), what is interesting to note is that its effect 
in the case of standalones is negative and significant and its effect on debt in the case of group 
affiliates is positive and significant.  Following Faccio and Lang (2001) one can argue that the 
extent to which debt can be used as an expropriation device depends on the balancing of the 
controlling shareholders incentives to expropriate on the one hand and the extent to which they 
factor in the concerns of informed suppliers of external finance on the other. If capital markets are 
well functioning and disclosure and accounting norms are transparent, external suppliers of 
finance would factor in the possibility of expropriation through debt in firms that are more 
vulnerable to such expropriation. If motive for expropriation dominates, one would expect firms 
with higher vulnerability to expropriation to have higher leverage. On the other hand if firms are 
more keen to access external finance for their growth, the controlling shareholders/managers of 
firms which are more vulnerable to expropriation, would have an incentive to signal its absence 
by holding lower levels of debt.  Applying this intuition we can interpret our differential results 
on the effect of ownership opacity (measure 2) on standalones and group affiliates. Given that the 
pyramidal structure of groups naturally facilitates expropriation combined with the generally 
perceived notion that groups have access to internal capital markets to raise funds for investment 
(see for example, Khanna and Palepu, 2000), the compulsions of firms with higher vulnerability 
to expropriation to signal the market through lower debt levels will be weaker. Our estimates with 
respect to group affiliates does show that firms more vulnerable to expropriation do indeed have 
higher levels of debt. The opposite is likely to hold for standalones which are typically run by 
professional managers concerned about reputation effects and with no internal capital market 
along the likes of group firms to access investment capital Thus, all other things remaining the 
same, standalone firms that are more opaque are likely to have higher incentive to signal the 
capital market of the absence of expropriation by holding lower levels of debt. 
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Our results with respect to debt and expropriation using our measures of opacity that proxy for 
the vulnerability to expropriation show that the conclusions are sensitive to the particular measure 
we use. The crux of the result is that while opacity does not matter in firm value for standalones, 
which is along expected lines, it is associated with a discount in value for group affiliates. More 
opaque group affiliates firms with fragmented ownership structures are also found to be more 
leveraged. However, the presence of opacity does not by itself undermine the role of debt in both 
standalones and group affiliates in reducing agency costs. The disciplining effect through higher 
debt commitments are found to outweigh any expropriation that might take place through debt in 
group affiliates. 
 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper we analyzed the role of debt in corporate governance with respect to a large 
emerging economy, India, where debt has played an important role as a source of external 
finance. Specifically, we analyzed if debt acts as a disciplining device in those companies where 
potential for overinvestment is present.  In doing so we undertook a comparative evaluation of the 
role of debt in group-affiliated versus non-affiliated (or stand alone) companies to gain insights 
into the important issue of whether the governance role of debt is sensitive to ownership and 
control structures. Additionally, we analyzed the role of institutional change in facilitating the 
disciplining role or mitigating the expropriating effect of debt.  
 
The primary findings that emerged from our analysis across the years is that while in the early 
years of institutional change, debt did not have any disciplinary effect on either low growth 
standalone or group affiliated firms, the disciplinary effect appeared in the later years, as 
institutions become more market oriented. We also found limited evidence of debt being used as a 
mechanism for expropriation in group affiliated firms that are more vulnerable to such 
expropriation. However, the disciplining effect of debt was found to persist even after controlling 
for expropriation possibilities.  In general, our results tend to support the hypotheses that the 
disciplining role of debt could be sensitive to ownership and control structures of corporations 
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  34Table 1: Trends in Financial Development and Financial Structure in India 
The table documents the trends in financial development and financial structure in India. The table is constructed   
using data from Report on Trends and Progress in Banking, various issues, Reserve Bank of India; Report of 
Development Banking in India, various issue, Industrial Development Bank of India; and Handbook of Statistics 
on the Indian Securities Markets, Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2004. Bank assets are calculated using 
data on both scheduled commercial banks and all India financial    institutions.    Bank credit includes credit by 
scheduled commercial banks only. 
 
 1991 1996 2000 2001 2002 
         
Stock Market Development         
Market Capitalization to GDP  0.21 0.44 0.47 0.27 0.27 
Value Traded to GDP  0.08 0.19 1.07 1.36 0.39 
Turnover Ratio   0.39 0.40 2.15 4.78 1.39 
       
Banking Sector Development       
Bank Assets to GDP  0.64 0.63 0.69 0.73 0.74 
Bank credit to GDP  0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.27 
         
Overall Financial Development         
Bank Assets plus market capitalization to GDP  0.85 0.94 1.02 1.01 1.02 
Bank Credit plus Value Traded to GDP  0.29 0.39 1.28 1.59 0.66 
       
Financial Structure       
Bank Assets to Market Capitalization  3.13 1.34 1.46 2.68 2.78 
Bank Credit to Value Traded  2.58 1.07 0.19 0.16 0.69 
       
 
 
  35Table 2: Quality of Corporate Governance Institutions in India in the Nineties 
 
The table gives a comparative assessment of the quality of corporate governance institutions in India and those in developed economies. The notes to the table and the 
various studies from which the table is complied are as follows: 
(1) Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores showing lower efficiency levels, less tradition of law and order and lower scores for higher risks, respectively. 
(2) The score is given on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with higher scores showing better disclosure levels, higher opacity in accounting and higher accounting standards, 
respectively. 
(3) The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values signifying stronger “Anti-director Rights”. 
(4) The index ranges from 0 to 4, with higher values signifying stronger “Creditor Rights”. 
*     Except for “Anti-Director Rights”, a values of 1 shows the presence of the relevant feature (i.e., implying that investor protection is in the law). 
**   Except for “Creditor Rights”, a value of 1 shows the presence of the relevant feature (i.e., implying that creditor protection is in the law).  
Compiled From: 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1999) Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance 54, 471-517. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1998) Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1999) The Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15, 222-279. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. 2000b) Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. Journal of Finance 55, 1-33. 
Bhattacharya, Utpal, Hazem Daouk and Michael Welker (2003) The World Price of Earnings Opacity, The Accounting Review, 2003, vol 78, 641-678. 
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US  10  10.00  9.98  168  85  25      71  0  1  1  1  1  5  0  0  0  1  0  1 
UK                       10  8.57 9.71  352  76  45  78 0 1  1 0 1 5 0  1 1 1 1 4
Germany      9  9.23  9.90  26  67  n.a.  62  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  3 
Japan  10  8.98                       9.67  10  71  81 65 1 0 1 1 1 4 0  0 0 1 1 2
India                                  8 4.17 7.75 9 61  79 57 1 0 1 1 1 5 0 1 1 1 1 4Table 3: Variables Definition 
 
The table defines the construction of the variables used in the empirical analyses. 
 
Variable Name  Definition 
  
Price earnings ratio    Annual mean daily closing stock price divided by operating earnings 
per share. 
 
Tobin’s Q  Market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by the 





Total debt divided by total assets. 
Long term leverage  Total long term debt divided by total assets. 
   
Group affiliation  Dummy variable; equals 1 if the firm is affiliated to a group. 
   
Non-debt tax shield  Operating income minus interest payments and tax payments over the 








Dummy variable; equals 1 for firms in the bottom decile of the 
interest coverage ratio distribution. Interest coverage ratio is total 
operating income divided by total interest expense. 
 
Free cash flow  Operating income minus taxes, interest expenditures and dividend 
payments divided by total assets 
   
Promoters’ share ownership  Percentage share ownership by promoters. 
Financial institutions’ share ownership  Percentage share ownership by financial institutions. 
Foreign share ownership  Percentage share ownership by foreign investors. 
Public share ownership  Percentage share ownership by public. 
   
Log of Total assets  Log of total assets.  Total assets  is measured in INR and units of ten 
million. 
Advertising intensity  Total advertisement expenditure divided by total assets. 
R & D intensity  Total research and development expenditures divided by total assets. 
   
Ownership opacity (measure 1)  Total promoters’ share ownership from aggregate data minus total 
promoters’ share ownership from 1 percent data, divided by total 
promoters’ share ownership from aggregate data. 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 2)  Total promoters’ share ownership obtained by aggregating separate 
holdings of 1 percent or more minus total promoters’ share ownership 
obtained by aggregating separate holdings of 5 percent or more, 
divided by total promoters’ share ownership obtained by aggregating 
separate holdings of 1 percent or more. 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 3) 
 
Total number of separate holdings by promoters of 1 percent or more 
minus total number of separate holdings by promoters of 5 percent or 
more, divided by total number of separate holdings by promoters of 1 
percent or more. 
 
  
Table 4(a): Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
The table reports the summary statistics for the years 1996, 2000, and 2003 for the full sample i.e., without 
distinguishing between high and low growth firms and group-affiliated and standalone firms. The reported 
numbers (except for sample size) are sample means. The asterisks denote the significance of the test of equality 
of yearly means with respect to those in the year 1996. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the difference is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are given in Table 3. 
 
 1996  2000  2003 
Sample size  
Price earnings ratio  
Tobin’s Q 
Long term leverage  
Leverage  
Free cash flow  
Total assets  
Financial institutions’ share ownership  
Foreign share ownership  
Promoters’ share ownership  







            154.05 









     0.06*** 
          204.52* 
5.15* 




   3.19*** 
   0.55*** 
   0.18*** 
   0.31*** 
   0.07*** 
         208.42 
             4.53 
  6.27*** 
          47.74** 
          31.87*** 
 
Table 4(b): Summary Statistics by Ownership Groups  
The table reports the summary statistics for the years 1996, 2000, and 2003 with firms classified into group-
affiliates and standalones based on their ownership status. Group-affiliates are those firms that are affiliated to a 
business group while standalones are non-affiliated firms. The reported numbers (except for sample size) are 
sample means. The asterisks denote the significance of the test of equality of means of the group-affiliates and 
the standalones samples for each year. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the difference is significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are given in Table 3. 
 













Sample size  
Price earnings ratio  
Tobin’s Q 
Long term leverage  
Leverage  
Free cash flow  
Total assets  
Financial institutions’ share ownership  
Foreign share ownership 
Promoters’ share ownership 



































   29.89 
   460 
3.22*** 


































Table 4(c): Summary Statistics by Low Growth and High Growth Firms  
The table reports the summary statistics for the years 1996, 2000, and 2003 with firms classified into low growth 
and high growth. Low growth firms are those with price-earnings ratio below the industry median while high 
growth firms are those with price-earnings ratio above the median. The reported numbers (except for sample size) 
are sample means. The asterisks denote the significance of the test of equality of means of the low growth and 
high growth samples for each year. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the difference is significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are given in Table 3. 













Sample size  
Price earnings ratio  
Tobin’s Q 
Long term leverage  
Leverage  
Free cash flow  
Total assets  
Financial institutions’ share ownership  
Foreign share ownership  
Promoters’ share ownership  










   40.95 
   34.49 








    9.58*** 
  40.80 











































  47.22*** 
  32.21 
 
Table 4(d): Summary Statistics by Ownership Groups  -- Low Growth Firms  
The table reports the summary statistics for the years 1996, 2000, and 2003 for low growth firms classified by 
their ownership status. Low growth firms are those with price-earnings ratio below the industry median. Group-
affiliates are those firms that are affiliated to a business group while standalones are non-affiliated firms. The 
reported numbers (except for sample size) are sample means. The asterisks denote the significance of the test of 
equality of means of the group-affiliates and the standalones samples for each year. ***, **, and * denote the 
difference is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are given in Table 3. 














Price earnings ratio  
Tobin’s Q 
Long term leverage  
Leverage  
Free cash flow  
Total assets  
Financial institutions’ share ownership  
Foreign share ownership  
Promoters’ share ownership 












    269 
    1.60 
    0.69 
   0.29*** 
    0.42 
    0.09 
200.39*** 
  7.31*** 

















     0.32*** 
     0.46*** 
     0.05*** 
  264.11*** 
     8.02*** 
     5.54 













    293 
    0.71 
   0.50*** 
   0.26*** 
   0.39*** 
   0.07*** 
270.24*** 
    8.08*** 
    6.61*** 
  47.54 





Table 4(e): Summary Statistics by Ownership Groups -- High Growth Firms  
 
The table reports the summary statistics for the years 1996, 2000, and 2003 for high growth firms classified by 
their ownership status. Low growth firms are those with price-earnings ratio above the industry median. Group-
affiliates are those firms that are affiliated to a business group while standalones are non-affiliated firms. The 
reported numbers (except for sample size) are sample means. The asterisks denote the significance of the test of 
equality of means of the group-affiliates and the standalones samples for each year. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote the difference is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The variable definitions are given 
in Table 3. 
 
 













Sample size  
Price earnings ratio  
Tobin’s Q 
Long term leverage  
Leverage  
Free cash flow  
Total assets  
Financial institutions’ share ownership 
Foreign share ownership  
Promoters’ share ownership 



































     5.97*** 
1.02 
      0.25*** 
     0.36*** 
    0.07*** 
549.53*** 
    7.89*** 
    9.99*** 
   51.34 





















  48.26 




Table 5(a): Determinants of Tobin’s Q  -- Low Growth Firms 
 
The table reports the regression results for the determinants of Tobin’s Q for low growth firms. Low 
growth firms are those with price-earnings ratio below the industry median. The coefficients are 2SLS 
estimates from the simultaneous equations model for Tobin’s Q and leverage.  Tobin’s Q is market 
value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets, and leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. P-values are in parenthesis. 
Industry dummies are included in the regression but their coefficient estimates are not reported. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 









Promoters’ share ownership 
 
Financial Institutions’ share ownership 
 
Foreign share ownership 
 




R & D intensity 
 
Industry dummies 





















































































Table 5(b): Determinants of Leverage  -- Low Growth Firms  
 
The table reports the regression results for the determinants of leverage for low growth firms. Low 
growth firms are those with price-earnings ratio below the industry median. The coefficients are 2SLS 
estimates from the simultaneous equations model for Tobin’s Q and leverage.  Tobin’s Q is market 
value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets, and leverage is total debt 
divided by total assets. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. P-values are in parenthesis. 
Industry dummies are included in the regression but their coefficient estimates are not reported. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 







Promoters’ share ownership 
 






Free cash flow 
 
Log of total assets 
 
Industry dummies 




















































































Table 6(a): Determinants of Tobin’s Q -- High Growth Firms  
 
The table reports the regression results for the determinants of Tobin’s Q for high growth firms. High growth firms 
are those with price-earnings ratio above the industry median. The coefficients are 2SLS estimates from the 
simultaneous equations model for Tobin’s Q and leverage.  Tobin’s Q is market value of equity plus book value of 
debt divided by book value of assets, and leverage is total debt divided by total assets. The explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 3. P-values are in parenthesis. Industry dummies are included in the regression but their 
coefficient estimates are not reported. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Standalones  Group  Affiliates 





Promoters’ share ownership 
 
Financial Institutions’ share ownership 
 
Foreign share ownership 
 




R & D intensity 
 
Industry dummies 













































































































































Table 6(b): Determinants of Leverage  -- High Growth Firms 
 
The table reports the regression results for the determinants of leverage for high growth firms. High growth firms 
are those with price-earnings ratio above the industry median. The coefficients are 2SLS estimates from the 
simultaneous equations model for Tobin’s Q and leverage.  Tobin’s Q is market value of equity plus book value of 
debt divided by book value of assets, and leverage is total debt divided by total assets. The explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 3. P-values are in parenthesis. Industry dummies are included in the regression but their 
coefficient estimates are not reported. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Standalones  Group  Affiliates 





Promoters’ share ownership 
 






Free cash flow 
 
Log of total assets 
 
Industry dummies 










































































































































Table 7: Ownership Opacity in Low Growth Firms 
 
The table gives summary statistics of opaqueness of promoters’ share ownership for standalone and 
group-affiliated firms. The alternative measures of opaqueness are defined in Table 3 and are based on 
the fragmented nature of promoters’ holdings.  Group-affiliates are those firms that are affiliated to a 
business group while standalones are non-affiliated firms. The reported numbers are sample means and 
medians. The asterisks denote the significance of the test of equality of means and medians of group-
affiliates and standalones. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the difference is significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 Standalones  Group  Affiliates 
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Promoters’ share ownership 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 1) 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 2) 
 















































































Table 8(a): Determinants of Tobin’s Q With Ownership Opacity –Low Growth Firms 
 
The table reports the regression results for the determinants of Tobin’s Q for low growth firms in the presence of 
ownership opacity.  Estimates are for the year 2003 for which detailed ownership data is available. Low growth 
firms are those with price-earnings ratio below the industry median. Ownership opacity captures the fragmented 
nature of promoters’ holdings and its alternative measures are defined in Table 3. The coefficients are 2SLS 
estimates from the simultaneous equations model for Tobin’s Q and leverage.  Tobin’s Q is market value of equity 
plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets, and leverage is total debt divided by total assets. The 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. P-values are in parenthesis. Industry dummies are included in the 
regression but their coefficient estimates are not reported. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the coefficient is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 





Promoters’ share ownership 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 1) 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 2) 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 3) 
 
Financial institutions’ share ownership 
 
Foreign share ownership 
 




R & D intensity 
 
Industry dummies 




































































































































































Table 8(b): Determinants of Leverage with Ownership Opacity – Low Growth Firms 
 
The table reports the regression results for the determinants of leverage for low growth firms in the presence of 
ownership opacity.  Estimates are for the year 2003 for which detailed ownership data is available. Low growth 
firms are those with price-earnings ratio below the industry median. Ownership opacitycaptures the fragmented 
nature of promoters’ holdings and its alternative measures are defined in Table 3. The coefficients are 2SLS 
estimates from the simultaneous equations model for Tobin’s Q and leverage.  Tobin’s Q is market value of 
equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets, and leverage is total debt divided by total assets. 
The explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. P-values are in parenthesis. Industry dummies are included in 
the regression but their coefficient estimates are not reported. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the coefficient 
is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 





Promoters’ share ownership 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 1) 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 2) 
 
Ownership opacity (measure 3)  
 






Free cash flow 
 
Log of total assets 
 
Industry dummies 
No. of observations 
R
2 
F-statistic 
-0.0554 
(0.2396) 
0.9419*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004* 
(0.0655) 
0.0141 
(0.2740) 
 
 
 
 
-0.2757*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0152 
(0.6413) 
0.0151 
(0.6373) 
0.0324 
(0.8574) 
0.0029 
(0.7547) 
Yes 
340 
0.72 
39.51*** 
-0.0392 
(0.4433) 
0.9763*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0209) 
 
 
-0.0321* 
(0.0629) 
 
 
-0.2812*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0123 
(0.7057) 
0.0121 
(0.7533) 
0.0233 
(0.8976) 
0.0009 
(0.9208) 
Yes 
340 
0.72 
39.38*** 
0.0079 
(0.8938) 
0.6831*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0006** 
(0.0422) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0179 
(0.2290) 
-0.2816*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0449 
(0.1357) 
0.0501 
(0.1889) 
0.0822 
(0.6818) 
0.0111 
(0.2800) 
Yes 
318 
0.67 
29.44*** 
-0.0539** 
(0.0649) 
0.8350*** 
(<0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.6766) 
-0.0062 
(0.7506) 
 
 
 
 
-0.7426*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0187 
(0.6220) 
0.0211 
(0.3099) 
0.8041** 
(0.0324) 
0.0061 
(0.1668) 
Yes 
292 
0.77 
43.48*** 
-0.0697** 
(0.0296) 
0.8400*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.9246) 
 
 
0.0365* 
(0.0736) 
 
 
-0.7675*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0167 
(0.6606) 
0.0215 
(0.2857) 
0.8790** 
(0.0176) 
0.0059 
(0.1798) 
Yes 
292 
0.79 
43.90*** 
-0.0423 
(0.1653) 
0.7979*** 
(<0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.6492) 
 
 
 
 
0.0187 
(0.1485) 
-0.7707*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0294 
(0.4064) 
0.0249 
(0.2163) 
0.8669** 
(0.0182) 
0.0049 
(0.2653) 
Yes 
282 
0.78 
45.19*** 
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